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Abstract 
This paper explores the defence of legitimate public concern as it applies to the 
media in the context of actions in defamation, breach of confidence and the 
recently affirmed tort of invasion of privacy. The potential for uncertainty and 
subsequent chilling of free speech under current approaches to determining the 
public interest in a publication is outlined. The paper argues that the defence of 
legitimate pubic concern should be aligned across these three actions to provide 
greater legal certainty. The defence of qualified privilege derived from 
defamation is examined and its potential applicability to breach of confidence 
and privacy canvassed. It concludes that qualified privilege should be extended 
to cases involving breach of confidence and invasion of privacy, and that this 
approach accommodates adequately the underlying interests at stake in these 
cases while also acknowledging the importance and responsibilities of the 
media within contemporary society. 
Statement on Word Length 
This paper, excluding headers, footnotes and quotations, consists of 
approximately 12,400 words. 
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I A NEW CHALLENGE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Following the Court of Appeal ' s recent determination in Hosking v Runting1 that 
actions in invasion of privacy may be brought in this country, media organisations 
are now faced with a new potential limitation to their claimed right to freedom of 
expression, and a new challenge in the consideration of whether to publish 
information which they believe to be in the public interest. 
In its formulation of the tort of invasion of privacy, the majority of the Court of 
Appeal also expressly recognised a defence to the tort whereby matters of 
' legitimate public concern' may be published free from liability. This defence they 
termed analogous2 to the public interest defences afforded to defendants to actions 
in defamation and breach of confidence; those of qualified privilege and the so-
called iniquity defence respectively. 
But having not been called upon to decide on the facts of that case, involving the 
surreptitious photographing of the celebrity plaintiffs' children in a public street, 
whether there was indeed a legitimate public concern in the publication of the 
children ' s images, the factors determining the availability of the defence remain, for 
would be publishers at least, perilously ambiguous. This ambiguity is compounded 
by the fact that the extent of the parallel defences in defamation and breach of 
confidence are also far from certain, and not currently aligned in such a manner that 
the analogy to privacy situations is a straightforward one. 
What is clear is that under each of defamation, breach of confidence and privacy, 
potentially justifiable limitations may be placed on the media' s (or any other 
individual's) right to freedom of expression, unless the disclosure of the 
information can itself be justified by a demonstrable public interest, in the courts 
words a legitimate public concern, in receiving the relevant information. Without 
Hosking v Run ting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA I O 1/03. 
Hosking v Run ting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA I O 1/03, para 135 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
clear guidance as to the subject matter to which legitimate public concern attaches, 
it is also clear that freedom of expression faces another, this time unjustifiable, 
limitation; the chilling of free speech that comes with uncertainty oflegal liability. 
This paper will argue that with the advent of common law privacy protection, it is 
timely that the public interest defences to these three causes of action be aligned so 
that they can truly be considered analogous. This alignment will allow for cross-
referencing of precedent across the actions, and present the media with a clearer test 
for whether the publication of a matter is indeed a matter of legitimate public 
concern. 
The approach advocated by this paper is one which recognises both the importance 
of the media as the conduit of important information within modern society and the 
context in which editorial decisions are made, but which also recognises that with 
the power and freedom enjoyed by the media comes a responsibility not to trample 
over competing rights. This approach is the defence of qualified privilege as 
outlined in the House of Lords decision of Reynolds v Times Newspapers,3 though 
tailored to fit within the New Zealand context. 
To advocate this approach successfully, and to justify granting the media this 
privileged position under the law, strength needs to be drawn from the public 
interest values underpinning freedom of expression. It will then be necessary to 
examine the context under which freedom of expression and the rights with which it 
comes into conflict are assessed by the courts. Following that, the defence of 
qualified privilege as it has been held to apply in cases of defamation will be 
explored, before examining its potential applicability to actions in breach of 
confidence and invasion of privacy. 
In order to be a convincing formula for the determination of legitimate public 
concern in cases involving media disclosures, qualified privilege should meet two 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and a/hers [1999] 4 All ER 609 (HL). 
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key criteria. It will need to have scope for the recognition of other public interest 
values inherent in the protection of confidences and privacy, while also affording 
more certainty than alternative means of determining where the balance of the 
public interest lies. 
A Freedom of Expression 
The interests upon which the asserted right to freedom of expression rest have been 
widely recognised and discussed by numerous observers, though with variance as to 
the significance to be accorded to each. In one of the seminal assessments of 
freedom of expression, Professor Thomas Emerson categorised the public interests 
underlying the right to freedom of expression into four fundamental interests: as a 
means of insuring individual self fulfillment; an essential process for advancing 
knowledge and discovering truth; a means of ensuring participation in societal 
decision making; and a method of ensuring a more adaptable and hence stable 
community.4 In Hosking v Runting Tipping J, referring to the work of Rishworth, 
Huscroft, Optican and Mahone/ noted three theoretical bases upon which freedom 
of expression was founded: the marketplace of ideas theory; the maintenance and 
support of democracy theory; and the liberty theory. The overlap between 
Emerson's four interests and the three theoretical bases espoused by Tipping J is 
clear, with Emerson's third and fourth categories combined into the maintenance 
and support of democracy theory. 
The Marketplace of Ideas theory assumes that open discussion and the free 
exchange of ideas and criticisms is a necessary condition for the advancement of 
collective knowledge and discovery of truth. The best test of truth it has been said 
11 
... is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market."6 By allowing the expression of contrary views, society as a whole 1s 
Thomas Emerson "Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment" (1963) 72 Yale LJ 877,879. 
Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003). 
Abrams v United States ( 19 I 9) 250 US 616, 631 per Holmes J. 
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afforded the opportunity to reject or modify any views that it considers to be 
erroneous, and thus advance its collective knowledge. It is a potent theory, though 
not without qualification. Acceptance of the theory assumes that social priority be 
given to the search for knowledge, and also assumes that when both truth and falsity 
are articulated, the truth will prevail. As has been pointed out by Frederick 
Schauer,7 in some circumstances additional propositions can retard knowledge as 
well as advance it. Just as truth might be found amongst these propositions, so 
might it be lost. 
The Maintenance and Support of Democracy theory sees freedom of expression as a 
means of ensuring participation by the population at large in societal decision 
making. Through this participation is formed the common consensus by which the 
sovereign population in a democracy governs itself, and by which stability is 
achieved through the maintenance of a necessary balance between change and 
consensus. Under this theory it is argued that any abridgement of the right to hear 
and consider views relevant to the purposes of self government abandons the 
fundamental democratic principle of consent of the governed, a consent that is only 
fully operative if it is fully informed. 8 Of further significance under this theory is 
the notion of democratic governments as servants of a sovereign people. This, it is 
argued, compels the recognition of the public's right to inspect and criticise the 
actions of their leaders or those that perform governmental functions. 9 
The Liberty theory asserts, in the words of Tipping J, that it is for "the ultimate 
good of society for citizens to be able to say and publish to others what they 
want." 10 Through the manifestation of thoughts, opinions and beliefs, expression 
facilitates the mental exploration and development of ideas integral to the autonomy 
and dignity of the individual. A restraint upon an individual's ideas or their ability 
Frederick F Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1982) pp 25-34. 
Edward Bloustein "The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher" 
(1974) 28 Rutgers L Rev 41, 51. 
Schauer, above, 46. 
10 Hosking v Runting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA I O 1/03, para 234 per Tipping J. 
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to express those ideas is thus a restriction on that person's liberty and an affront to 
their dignity. As Tipping J noted, this is the broadest and potentially most 
problematic of his three theories: "The Liberty theory rests on the ultimate public 
good; but the full flowering of the theory undoubtedly has the capacity to harm the 
public good." 11 
There are thus strong public interest values that lie beneath the arguments in favour 
of freedom of expression, but also some equally valid public interests that would 
argue in favour of its curtailment. To complicate matters further, these competing 
interests may overlap on a variety of levels, meaning that they seek to achieve the 
same wider public interest goals, albeit through different means. For example the 
dignitary and autonomic interests evident in the liberty theory of freedom of 
expression may in some instances be better served by protecting the privacy or 
personal space of an individual to develop the ideas, thoughts and beliefs that are 
later manifested through their expression. Likewise the marketplace of ideas theory 
might be weakened if ideas that are ultimately of public benefit are not developed 
because the shelter and incentive to do so, such as financial returns, are threatened 
if during its development, the idea can be communicated to all and sundry. Equally 
the claim that freedom of expression enhances participation in a democratic society 
may be reversed in as much as people would be more willing to participate in public 
affairs if they knew this did not give the media licence to publish embarrassing 
details about their private lives or otherwise face slurs on their reputation.
12 
Without the protection of reputational interests, or those in confidence or privacy, 
participation in the public domain might well be open only to the perfect, the 
conformist or the shameless. 
B 
II 
12 
The New Zealand Context 
Hosking, above, para 234 per Tipping J. 
E Paton-Simpson " Human Interests: Privacy and Free Speech in the Balance" (1995) NZULR 225,233. 
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In this country, the competition between the interests underpinning the right to 
freedom of expression and those interests that may be harmed through the exercise 
of that right takes place in the context of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Under the Act, the right to freedom of expression is affirmed by section 14 of the 
Act which states that: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including 
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in 
any form." 
This right however, does not provide an absolute licence to the media to publish 
what it sees fit. Section 5 of the Bill of Rights prescribes that all rights contained in 
the Act may be limited, provided that such limitation can be "demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society." It is a position that accords with this country's 
collectivist or communitarian ethic, 13 a position shared generally with our 
Commonwealth counterparts but which stands in contrast to the elevated status 
granted to freedom of expression in the United States. Thus the right to freedom of 
expression may be curtailed to the extent appropriate to ensure that other rights of 
value to our society, a free and democratic society, are accommodated, be they 
founded in legislation or the common law. 14 
The protection of an individual's right not to have their reputation sullied unjustly, 
or to prevent personal information or information which they have imparted to 
another in confidence from being disclosed to others, have long been recognised as 
justifiable limitations upon the media's exercise of it's right to freedom of 
expression. As was noted by Elias J in Lange, the fact that freedom of expression is 
given explicit recognition in the Bill of Rights, whereas the competing rights are 
not, is not indicative of any greater weight attaching to the former. The inherent 
dignity of the individual that lies at the heart of the protection afforded through 
13 
14 
PT Rishworth "Defamation, Racial Disharmony and Freedom of Expression" in Grant Huscroft and PT 
Rishworth Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 
1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 174, 174. 
Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd [I 997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 (I-IC) per Elias J. 
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defamation, breach of confidence and privacy actions, is the fundamental value 
underpinning our Bill of Rights. 15 
There is thus a fundamental tension between the right accorded to each individual to 
express and receive information on any subject and in any form 16 and those rights 
which seek to place a restriction upon the publication of information due to the 
effect that publication would have upon an individual or group about whom it is 
concerned. Significant public interests are vested in these competing rights. In the 
absence of any universally applicable formulation of the public interest, 17 the 
determination of whether a particular publication should be permitted or restrained 
requires the striking of a balance between the competing values. 
It cannot therefore be argued that the media's right to freedom of expression should 
go unfettered. Some have attempted to argue that the media has a duty to publish 
that which the public is interested in, and that through the market place they have 
the best and most direct mechanism for testing the degree of public interest in a 
matter. 18 Such an argument, however, ignores any idea of the legitimacy or 
reasonableness of the interest and the value that the media's right to freedom of 
expression has against the rights and interests of others. The justification for giving 
any interests legal consideration is that they are more or less reasonable wants, 
according to standards which it is the business of the judge or legislator to elicit 
from the bulk of demands coming forward." 19 Logically, the courts are the 
appropriate forum for such determinations. 20 The argument also ignores the well 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above, 31 per Elias J. Support for this contention is drawn from the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Hill v The Church of Scientology of Toronto ( I 995) 126 DLR ( 4th) I 29, I 63 per Cory J and from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [ 1994] I NZLR 48 (CA). 
See Glendon A Schubert The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept (Greenwood Press, Westport (Conn.) 1982) 220: " .. . our investigation has failed to reveal a statement of public interest theory that offers much promise either as a guide to public officials who are supposed to make decisions in the public interest, or to research scholars who might wish to investigate the extent to which governmental decisions are empirically made in the public interest." 
F Zimmerman "Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' s Privacy Tort" ( 1983) 68 Cornell L Rev 291 , 353. 
R Pound "A Survey of Social Interests" (1944) 57 Harv LR l , 39. 
See Reynolds v Times Newspapers [ 1999] 4 All ER 609, 624 (HL) per Lord Nicholls; See also Hosking v Runting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA 101 /03, para I 32 per Gault P and Blanchard J. 
7 
documented decline of the public service ethos in modem media and an increased 
emphasis on celebrity, fashion, human interest and lifestyle features. Increasingly 
the predominance of commercial forces and competition for advertiser revenue has 
seen entertainment gain favour over information. 21 
The legislature and judiciary have frequently acknowledged that freedom of 
expression must accommodate other values and that this accommodation must 
endeavour to strike the right balance between the competing interests. The key 
questions are how under defamation, breach of confidence and privacy these 
interests can be accommodated, how the unique position held by the media should 
inform this accommodation, and at what stage of the inquiry this balancing exercise 
should occur. 
The courts have adopted as the touchstone to this balancing exercise the 
determination of legitimate public concern in the matter being published. This 
touchstone recognises that there is a greater social utility in making those matters 
known than in withholding them to protect another's rights. However to date there 
is still a significant degree of ambiguity as to how this determination is made, and 
whether this determination is alone sufficient to properly accommodate the 
competing values and acknowledge the context in which they have come into 
conflict. 
C The Need for Certainty: Chilling Free Speech 
While it is obvious that protecting the rights of others will justifiably limit the 
media's right to freedom of expression in some circumstances, if there is a 
significant degree of uncertainty over the types of publications that will attract legal 
liability, the result would be an unjustifiable limitation on freedom of speech. 
Publishers fearful of potential lawsuits will be reluctant to publish information that 
21 See generally L Gorman and D McLean Media and Society in the Twentieth Century: A Historical 
introduction (Blackwell Publishing, Maiden (MA) 2003); James Curran and Jean Seaton Power Without 
Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain (5ed, Routledge, London, 1997). 
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is not clearly afforded section 14 protection. Information of public interest which 
may, following judicial proceedings, be afforded protection from liability, may not 
reach the public due to the fear that the Court's balancing exercise will weigh in 
favour of the complainant after taking into account considerations not foreseen by 
the publisher. Financial implications will then drive decisions over whether to 
publish certain material, undermining the public interest driver of what matters the 
media should be circulating to its audience. Arguably a media organisation will be 
more likely to accept the risk of legal costs and potentially hefty damages, if the 
material it publishes is likely to offset these through increased circulation and 
revenue. Such pragmatism would serve to further encourage the rise of 
sensationalism over public interest reporting. 
D A Dazzling Uncertainty: The Campbell Litigation 
The litigation in the United Kingdom following the Mirror's publication of an 
article and accompanying photographs describing Naomi Campbell's battles with 
drug addiction provides a prime example of the type of uncertainty that pervades 
this area of law. There, the trial judge's finding in favour of the supermodel,22 was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal,23 whose decision was similarly overturned in 
the House of Lords by a mere 3:2 majority.24 
The subject matter of the publication was at the marginal end of most people's 
understanding of legitimate public concern. Baroness Hale, who in the House of 
Lords decision found in favour of the supermodel summed it up best: "Put crudely, 
it is a prima donna celebrity against a celebrity-exploiting tabloid newspaper."25 
However throughout the course of the litigation the public's interest in being 
informed of Ms Campbell's drug addiction was acknowledged by the Courts and 
conceded by her Counsel. This accepted public interest stemmed from her previous 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 499 (QB). 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] I All ER 224 (CA). 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995 (HL). 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995, para 143 (HL) per Baroness Hale. 
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public statements that she, unlike many in the fashion industry, did not take 
recreational drugs. 
For Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman, the acceptance of the public interest in 
having the public record put straight was decisive. Lord Nicholls found that the 
Mirror's publication of additional information, which was at issue before the court, 
namely the fact that Ms Campbell was receiving treatment at Narcotics 
Anonymous, the details of the treatment, and photographs leaving a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting were of "such an unremarkable and consequential nature" that 
they should not be considered separately from the information that could be 
properly disclosed.26 Lord Hoffman was of the opinion, shared by the Court of 
Appeal, that following a finding of legitimate public concern, editorial latitude must 
be given: "It is unreasonable to expect that in matters of judgment any more than 
accuracy of reporting, newspapers will always get it absolutely right. To require 
them to do so would tend to inhibit the publication of facts which should in the 
public interest be made known."27 
Lords Carswell and Hope, and Baroness Hale, in allowing Ms Campbell's appeal, 
instead considered the additional information published by the Mirror separately 
from that which had been accepted could be disclosed. Considering the question of 
whether the supermodel 's right to privacy provided sufficient justification for the 
limitation on the Mirror's exercise of freedom of expression, their Lordships were 
primarily influenced by the need for anonymity and confidentiality for the success 
of her treatment for drug addiction. 28 Lord Hope went further, noting the offense 
caused to Ms Campbell by the knowledge that she had been secretly followed and 
photographed.29 The fact that the Mirror's article painted the supermodel 's battle 
with addiction in a sympathetic light was irrelevant.30 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Campbell (HL), above, para 26 per Lord Nicholls. 
Campbell (HL), above, para 63 (HL) per Lord Hoffman. 
Campbell (HL), above, para 95 per Lord Hope; paras 144-146 per Baronness Hale; para 165 per Lord 
Carswell. 
Campbell (HL), above, para 98 per Lord Hope. 
Campbell (HL), above, para 156 per Baroness Hale. 
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The majority decision is not entirely unreasonable on the facts of the case and the 
approach adopted therein. As was noted by Lord Hoffman, different people will 
have different views on what is necessary or proportionate to publish in any given 
circumstance. 31 The problem however stems from the fact that under the approach 
adopted by the majority, the media are left in the invidious position of second 
guessing individual judges' assessments of where the balance of the public interest 
lies, including the necessity of each and every aspect of their publication. Given the 
divergence of judicial opinion in this case alone, it is difficult to see how the media 
could, under such an approach, comfortably predict its fortunes in any litigation 
involving the balancing of the public interests in free speech against those in 
protecting privacy. 
The argument that more certainty is provided to both complainants and media 
defendants alike through a defence of qualified privilege, rests on the assumption 
that once a legitimate public concern in a matter is established, the question 
becomes one of whether the media defendant has exercised responsibility during the 
process of publication. This removes the need for the courts to assess the public 
interest served by the disclosure of individual elements of the publication. Instead 
these elements should contribute to the finding of whether the action has been prima 
facie established. The media defendant would then be required to establish that the 
matter was one of legitimate public concern and counter a claim by the plaintiff that 
they had not reported on it in a responsible manner. Should they fail to do so, few 
would argue that they should not be held to account. 
To accept this proposition requires an acceptance that the media deserves to be 
conferred with this privilege. 
31 Campbell (HL), above, para 59 per Lord Hoffman. 
11 
D The Media in Society 
In contemporary society, the media represents the pivotal means by which 
information is communicated to the public. The courts have long recognised the 
fundamental importance of the role of the media in society. 32 The recognition of the 
constitutional importance of the media in the communication of information and 
comment on political matters dates back to its classification as the 'fourth estate' of 
government by Lord Macaulay in the early nineteenth century and has been 
frequently acknowledged since. Through the media the causes of self government 
and social decision making are advanced.33 As Lord Nicholls noted in Reynolds 
"without freedom of expression by the media, freedom of expression would be a 
hollow concept."34 
The media's importance as the public's primary information source has also 
received legislative recognition. The Defamation Act 1992 confers qualified 
privilege, commonly known as reporters' privilege, on reports of the proceedings of 
a range of organisations, including Parliament, the courts, local authorities and 
various communjty associations; press conferences and other public meetings.35 
This shows an acceptance that the information contained in these types of reports is 
of legitimate concern to the public and the reporting of it is in the public's best 
interests. The courts have been prepared to accord liberal interpretations to this 
privilege and the bodies to which it applies. 36 
Despite not being expressly conferred on the media this privilege is, by the very 
nature of the way that information is disseminated in society, of most relevance to 
the media. Indeed in contemporary society the degree of exposure required for 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See for example Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd & £/stein [ 1981] 2 WLR 848, 865 (CA) per Lord 
Denning. 
Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the 
Public Should Expect (Crown Publishers, New York, 200 I) 19: " ... by telling the truth ... the public have 
the information they require to be sovereign." 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [1999] 4 All ER 609, 622 (HL) per Lord Nicholls. 
See Defamation Act 1992, sch I, part 2. 
John F Burrows and Bill Wilson Media Law (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2003) 8. 
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information to cause damage to a person's reputation, or otherwise intrude on 
confidence or privacy interests, can almost only be achieved through the media. 
The privilege is conferred upon 'fair and accurate' reports, and is limited by 
sections 17 to 19 of the Act, dictating that the privilege will not be conferred in 
circumstances where the publication of the report is prohibited by law, the report or 
matter is not one of public interest to the recipients, a complainant's explanation or 
contradiction was inadequately taken account of, or the publisher took improper 
advantage of the occasion of publication. Such limitations are consistent with the 
concept of journalistic responsibility as enunciated by the courts. 
Any assessment of the exercise of journalistic responsibility will, however, only be 
triggered by a finding that the matter about which the publication is made is one of 
legitimate public concern. It is argued that by aligning the test for legitimate public 
concern across the actions of defamation, breach of confidence and invasion of 
privacy, the greater body of precedent available will provide a modicum of certainty 
in identifying those matters that can properly be considered to be of legitimate 
public concern. 
There are other valid reasons behind the argument for such an alignment. There is 
considerable potential for overlap across actions in defamation, breach of 
confidence and invasion of privacy. Should the method of ascertaining the public 
interest in a particular publication differ depending on the action, complainants 
would have the opportunity to pursue the cause of action most likely to result in a 
finding in their favour. There is also potential for a single publication to bring about 
claims under a combination of these actions. In P v D,37 P brought an action under 
breach of confidence and privacy. The claim in breach of confidence was denied 
due to there being no evidence of the information being disclosed to the defendant 
through a relationship of confidence. The claim in privacy however was upheld. In 
Hosking, contributing to Anderson J's reluctance to introduce a tort of invasion of 
37 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
13 
privacy was the fear that a person aggrieved by a publication may be able to gain 
injunctive relief for the publication of true material that would otherwise be denied 
in a defamation case following a plea oftruth. 38 
The injury caused by an alleged invasion of privacy will in many be inextricably 
tied to the lowering of the complainant's standing in the eyes of others, the very 
crux of a defamation action. 39 If different approaches are taken under defamation 
and invasion of privacy, complainants will be afforded an easier route to prevent 
publication of matters, which, under a well-established justification in defamation, 
would be permitted. 
II DEFAMATION AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE 
Defamation protects a person's reputation against unjustifiable attack. 40 The public 
interest value in the protection of reputation is tied fundamentally to the protection 
of the dignity of the individual; the respect (and self respect) that arises from full 
membership in society.41 The recognition and protection of reputation is a means by 
which members of society show deference to the individual dignity of other 
members of society. In the House of Lords, Lord Nicholls expressly recognised that 
the protection of reputation is not simply a matter of the dignity of the individual 
concerned in the particular case, and concluded that its protection is conducive to 
the public good: "[Reputation] also forms the basis of many decisions in a 
democratic society which are fundamental to its well-being: whom to employ or 
work for, whom to promote, whom to do business with or to vote for."42 
Qualified privilege enables the maker of a prima facie defamatory statement of fact 
to escape liability in defamation, without needing to establish the truth of the 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Hosking v Runting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA I O 1/03, para 270 per Anderson J. 
Sim v Stretch (1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (HL) per Lord Atkin 
John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand ( 4 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1999) 8. 
Robert Post "Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution" ( 1986) 74 Cal if L 
Rev 691, 740. 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [1999] 4 All ER 609, 622 (HL) per Lord Nicholls. 
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statement. The basis of the privilege is the common convenience and welfare of 
society.
43 
The privilege is defeated if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant was 
motivated by ill will or took improper advantage of the occasion of publication.44 In 
general, the privilege arises in circumstances where there is a common interest in a 
communication, or where there is a duty to communicate and a corresponding 
interest in receiving the communication arising out of legal, moral or social 
circumstances.45 If the reciprocal interest and duty are established then the matter 
can properly be considered one of legitimate public concern, meaning that 
disclosure to the general public of alleged statements of fact in relation to that 
matter is privileged. 
The breadth of subject matter to which this qualified privilege defence may attach is 
currently clouded by an inconsistency in its application between the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal and what was until recently, this country's highest court, the Privy 
Council. 
In Lange v Atkinson46 our Court of Appeal overcame its previous reluctance to 
attribute qualified privilege to widespread publications by reason solely of there 
being a public interest in the matter communicated47 and that certain political 
statements made to the general public may attract privilege.48 The House of Lords 
decision in Reynolds v Times Newspapers cited with approval in the Privy Council 
decision of Bonnick49 had previously accepted that qualified privilege could attach 
to any matter of legitimate public concern. It also laid down that the responsibility 
shown by the publisher in light of the circumstances of the publication, was to be 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
4g 
49 
Toogood v Spyring (1834) 149 ER I 044, I 049 per Parke B. 
Defamation Act 1992, s 19(2). 
Adam v Ward [ 1916-17] All ER 157, 170 (HL) per Lord Atkinson. 
Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA). 
See Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway [ 1960] NZLR 69, 83 (CA) per North J and Templeton v Jones [ 1984] I 
NZLR 448, 460 (CA) per Cooke J. 
Lange, above, 428 per Blanchard J: "generally-published statements made about the actions and qualities 
of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament and those with immediate aspirations to be members, 
so far as those actions and qualities directly affect or affected their capacity (including their personal 
ability and willingness) to meet their public responsibilities." In Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 
(CA): the attribution of qualified privilege was held to be subject to 6 considerations listed at pages 390-
391 and 400. 
Bonnick v Morris and others [2003] I AC 300 (PC). 
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considered in the assessment of whether the requisite duty and interest exist.50 In 
Reynolds convincing arguments were put forward as to why qualified privilege 
should not be accorded to limited categories of subject matter such as political 
discussion,5' and as noted media law commentator John Burrows has pointed out, 
"logically it is not easy to see why in New Zealand we should not also extend the 
privilege this far."52 Part of the reluctance of the Court of Appeal to embrace a 
broader formulation of legitimate public concern, might have been attributable to a 
fear of opening up qualified privilege to an unknown, and potentially dubious 
calibre of subject matter. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeal in Lange v 
Atkinson felt its formulation more appropriate to this country's social context and 
the dynamics of our media industry, noting that the United Kingdom had observed 
the worst excesses of tabloid journalism.53 
In order for the qualified privilege defence to be of use in cases involving an alleged 
breach of confidence or privacy, the wider formulation of its ambit as used in the 
United Kingdom would need to be adopted in this country also. Our Court of 
Appeal's fears, while understandable, would be ameliorated to a large extent if 
qualified privilege was the defence established across all three causes of action, 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [ 1999) 4 All ER 609, 626 (HL) Lord Nicholls sets out a non-exhaustive list of considerations to be taken into account in determining whether a media defendant had exercised their duty to publish properly so as to be conferred with a qualified privilege relating to 
statements of fact: "(l) The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. (2) The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern. (3) The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. ( 4) The steps taken to verify the information. (5) The status of the information . The allegation may have already been the subject of an investigation which commands respect. (6) The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable commodity. (7) Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not always be necessary. (8) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiffs side of the story. (9) The 
tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact. (I 0) The circumstances of the publication, including the timing." 
Reynolds at 640 (HL) per Lord Cooke ' there are other p1,1blic figures who exercise great practical power 
over the lives of people or great influence in the formation of public opinion or as role models. Such power or influence may indeed exceed that of most politicians. The rights and interests of citizens in democracies are not restricted to the casting of votes. Matters other than those pertaining to government and politics may be just as important in the community; and they may have as strong a claim to be free of restraints on 
freedom of speech ... 
John F Burrows and Bill Wilson Media Law (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2003) 10. 
Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 398 (CA). 
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thereby allowing a far vaster body of precedent to help in the determination of the 
type of situations in which a legitimate public concern could properly be found. 
Even if a Reynolds type approach to legitimate public concern were to be followed 
in this country, our statutory scheme would necessitate a different approach to the 
question of whether the qualified privilege has arisen or has in fact been abused by 
the defendant. As was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Lange, section 19 of 
Defamation Act 1992 dictates that in New Zealand the occasion of privilege and its 
misuse are separate enquiries; the former being a matter for the judge, and the latter 
for the jury, to determine. While this may have a structural impact, it should not 
present a significant problem for standardising the determination of legitimate 
public concern through the reciprocal interest and duty test in this country. It was 
noted by the Court of Appeal, these two aspects must be viewed together when 
determining whether in combination the law is striking a proper balance between 
the competing interests. 
Rt Hon Justice Tipping succinctly identified the distinction in an article 
commenting on journalistic responsibility.54 In the United Kingdom qualified 
privilege exists when words in question are responsibly written or spoken on a 
subject of legitimate concern to their addressees. In the New Zealand context, an 
occasion of qualified privilege exists when the words are written or spoken on a 
subject of legitimate concern to the persons to whom they are addressed. The 
privilege will, however, be lost if the publication was predominantly motivated by 
ill will towards the complainant or if improper advantage of the occasion of 
privilege was taken. For a true alignment to take place, this approach would also be 
required of a qualified privilege defence to breach of confidence or invasion of 
privacy. 
54 Rt Hon Justice Tipping "Journalistic Responsibility, Freedom ofSpecch and Protection of Reputation -Striking the Right Balance Between Citizens and the Media" (2002) I O Waikato LR I, 7. 
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A Accommodating the Competing Rights 
In Reynolds and Bonnick it was recognised that in defamation the balance between 
freedom of expression and protection of reputation is appropriately struck through 
the establishment of legitimate public concern and the exercise of journalistic 
responsibility. A defence of qualified privilege formulated along these lines 
recognises the values underlying both freedom of expression and protection of 
reputation and provides a reasonably simple formula for the accommodation of 
these two interests. The starting point is the position of the media as free to publish 
any information in any form. If this publication is likely to lower the complainant's 
standing in the eyes of others, and the veracity of the facts are unable to proved by 
the communicator of that information, the values inherent in reputation are given 
legal protection through their liability in defamation. If however, the matter can be 
identified as being of legitimate public concern by way of the reciprocal duty and 
interest test, and provided that the publisher has exhibited due care in the exercise 
of its duty to publish, then the limitation on freedom of expression sought by the 
complainant cannot be demonstrably justified. If the reciprocal duty and interest 
arise on the facts of a case involving a widespread publication by a media 
defendant, the balance must lean in favour of freedom of expression and the greater 
social good. 
B Accommodating the Practicalities of Journalism 
In its exploration of the factors to be considered when determining whether a 
publisher has exercised its journalistic responsibilities, the House of Lords observed 
that in other professions, the law demands the exercise of reasonable care and skill 
in all the circumstances, and that the media should be no different. This observation 
in Reynolds builds on Tipping J's recognition of the same in Lange in which he 
questioned " ... whether the public interest in freedom of expression is so great that 
the accountability which society requires of others, should not also to this extent be 
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required of the news media."55 The expectation that the media exercise reasonable 
care and skill in its publication is an appealing one, with which few would disagree. 
The Court of Appeal in Lange made clear that failure to give responsible 
consideration to the truth or falsity of the publication, as required by the nature of 
the subject matter and breadth of intended audience, would be sufficient to show 
that the duty of care had not been exercised. 56 The list of factors that contribute to 
the assessment of whether journalistic responsibility has been exercised, as outlined 
by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds, provides editors with a much easier forum for the 
assessment of potential liability than second guessing the weight a judge may or 
may not attribute to the public interest values that they and potential complainants 
may put forward. 
The considerations espoused by Lord Nicholls are similar to the statutory 
limitations to privilege found in sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Defamation Act 1992, 
and share much with the duties that the media industry expects of itself. The New 
Zealand Press Council, established in 1972 as an independent forum for the 
resolution of complaints against the press, has issued a statement of principles to 
guide the determination of such complaints. Echoing the considerations of 
Reynolds, the principles outline publishers' responsibilities to provide accurate, fair 
and balanced information that does not mislead its readers. A duty of care to ensure 
that sources are well informed and that information provided is reliable; to respect 
the privacy of the individual, particularly children or those in situations of shock or 
grief; and to distinguish fact from comment or opinion are also expressly stated. 57 
Similarly, the Broadcasting Standards Authority, established in 1989, is charged 
with encouraging the development and observance of broadcasting standards 
consistent with statutory requirements and approved codes of practice. Invariably 
these codes are consistent with expectations of accuracy, fairness and balance, 
55 Lange v Atkinson (1998] 3 NZLR 424,477 (CA) per Tipping J. 
56 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 40 I (CA). 
57 New Zealand Press Council <http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/principles.htm> (last accessed 27 September 
2004). 
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respect of the individual's pnvacy, good taste and decency and protection of 
children. 58 
The factors that thus contribute to a finding that media responsibility has, or has 
not, been exercised are thus familiar to editors and broadcasters alike, and set a 
behavioural threshold no higher than that which the media expects of itself. 
Given their familiarity with such principles and standards, editors operating in a 
market where news and other information date very quickly are much better placed 
to know if they have done all they can to substantiate and ensure balance in material 
that they publish, than whether elements of their publication weaken its public 
interest value. As was noted by Lord Hoffman in Campbell "the practical 
exigencies of journalism demand that some latitude must be given. Editorial 
decisions have to be made quickly and with less information than is available to a 
court which afterwards reviews the matter at leisure. "59 
C The Offer of Certainty 
The concept of journalistic responsibility as enunciated in Reynolds grants a greater 
degree of certainty not only to litigants, offering as it does a checklist of actions that 
the media might be expected to comply with in the exercise of its qualified 
privilege, but also to the judges before whom such cases arise. Without it, there is 
potential for the weight of public interest values to be coloured by the judges' own 
value systems and importance they place on the individual publication before them. 
This, as was argued by counsel for The Times in Reynolds, would not only involve 
an unpredictable outcome, but would put the judge in the role of censor which in a 
free society ought to be occupied by the editor. The judge's position is infinitely 
more clear if his or her role is to establish whether the media defendant has 
exercised due care. 
58 
59 
Broadcasting Standards Authority <http://www.bsa.govt.nz/broadcastingact.htm> (last accessed 27 
September 2004). 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004) 2 All ER 995, para 62 (HL) per Lord Hoffman . 
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That is not to say the balancing exercise of the courts becomes a simple task, 
however, as the establishment of legitimate public concern through the reciprocal 
duty and interest test, is still lacking in, and potentially beyond, definitional 
precision. However as has been discussed previously and will be explored further in 
this paper, if this same test for legitimate public concern is also utilised in breach of 
confidence and invasion of privacy actions, then a clearer picture of the 
circumstances giving rise to a reciprocal duty and interest will emerge from a much 
larger body of precedent. 
D Exercising Responsible Journalism 
Under New Zealand's defamation legislation, the onus of proving that the duty to 
publish has not been exercised responsibly falls on the plaintiff. The courts will 
then face what should be a reasonably simple and objective inquiry into the 
information gathering practices and degree of care exercised by the defendant. The 
considerations set down by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds and mirrored in the Press 
Council principles and Broadcasting Standards Authority's codes, will be the key 
indicators of whether the media has shown due care in the exercise of its duty to 
communicate. 
In essence these considerations can be reduced to the following three basic 
questions: 
Has the defendant taken reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the information? 
What will be reasonable will depend on the gravity of the information published, 
but should consider the steps taken to verify the information and check the 
credibility of sources if these are thrown into doubt by the plaintiff. 
ls the publication balanced? This can be put into question by a plaintiff and 
determined by the court on the basis of the information that has been published. 
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Key considerations will be whether competing versions of events have been 
expressed, whether the plaintiffs point of view has been acknowledged or indeed 
whether the plaintiff was given the opportunity to comment. 
Is the publication fair? Again able to be objectively determined on the basis of the 
information published, fairness will be evident in the tone and timing of the 
publication. Publications that are overtly critical, derogatory, or timed to maximise 
humiliation of the subject, will be denied the protection of qualified privilege. 
Indeed they are objective indicators of a motivation of ill will towards the plaintiff, 
which under the subjective test required by common law malice, can be 
extraordinarily difficult to establish. 
The failure to satisfy these three key considerations will be considerably easier for 
the courts to objectively assess than the vagaries of a 'balancing of public interests' 
exercise. 
Can these concepts of legitimate public concern and journalistic responsibility be 
applied to breach of confidence and privacy actions without compromising the 
acknowledgement of the competing public interests? 
III APPLICATION TO BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 
Structurally, there is alignment between the iniquity defence to an action in breach 
of confidence and the qualified privilege defence. To establish that there has been a 
breach of confidence, a complainant is required to prove that the information has a 
necessary quality of confidence, that they imparted that information in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and that there has or will be 
an unauthorised use of that information to the complainant's detriment.60 A 
60 Coco v A. N. Clark(Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 47-8 (HCJ) per Megarry J. This was endorsed by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in AB Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co Pty Ltd [1978) 2 NZLR 
515 (CA). Note that following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hosking, it is clear that in New 
Zealand a relationship of confidence and the imparting of information as part of that relationship are 
required for the action to succeed. 
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defendant may however escape liability provided that they are able to establish that 
they have "just cause or excuse"61 for breaching that confidence. The common 
law's recognition that the confidentiality of a matter may be outweighed by the 
public interest in it was first enunciated in Gartside v Outram62 in which Wood V. 
C. famously asserted that: "there is no confidence as to the disclosure of an 
iniquity."63 In Initial Services v Putteri!z64 Lord Denning extended the meaning of 
iniquity to any misconduct, committed and in contemplation, of such a nature that 
the disclosure is justified in the public interest. Thus as with actions in defamation 
we see a circumstance whereby freedom of expression may be curtailed by a 
competing interest in the protection of confidences, with a forum under ') ust cause 
or excuse" in which the competing public interests may be balanced against each 
other. The result of this balancing exercise will establish whether it is appropriate 
that a public interest defence is afforded to the defendant. Though Wood VC's 
dictum gives the impression that iniquitous communications do not attract the 
protection afforded to confidences, it has subsequently been more accurately 
characterised as a defence to breach of confidence, rather than an aspect for 
consideration during the complainant's establishment of the cause of action. There 
are thus structural similarities between the iniquity defence and qualified privilege. 
Conceptually there is also a similarity between the identification of legitimate 
public concern through the reciprocal duty and interest test. In Initial Services Lord 
Denning, in his extension of the iniquity defence, saw it as merited on the grounds 
that "no private obligations can dispense with the universal one which lies on every 
member of society to discover every design which may be formed contrary, to the 
laws of society, to destroy the public welfare."65 The concepts of interest and duty 
are both recognised here; the interest stemming from the public welfare and duty 
arising from the universal obligation to make known any threats to that welfare. 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349,36 1 (CA) per Lord Denning MR. 
Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113 . 
Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113, 116 per Wood YC. 
Initial Services Ltd v Putteri/1 and Another [1968] I QB 396 (CA). 
Initial Services Ltd v Putterill and Another [1968] I QB 396,405 (CA) per Lord Denning MR. 
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In principle, it would seem that there is little to stand in the way of applying the 
qualified privilege defence to actions in breach of confidence, but does the 
identification of legitimate public concern combined with the exercise of 
journalistic responsibility provide adequate protection to the public interest values 
underlying the protection of confidences? 
The public interest values inherent in the protection of confidences, like 
reputational protection have a primary focus of preserving individual autonomy. At 
its heart is the belief that an individual or other legal entity has the right to control 
access to information about itself that is imparted in confidence. Added to this is the 
recognition of the importance of candour and trust in specific relationships such as 
those between lawyer and client, and doctor and patient.66 In relationships of this 
ilk, full disclosure of information is required to achieve important social ends such 
as full and appropriate legal representation or accurate diagnosis and treatment of 
medical conditions. If a party was unsure as to whether others outside the 
relationship of confidentiality were able to access the information communicated 
within the relationship, the disincentive to freely communicate would be a weighty 
one. 
The fundamental values underpinning breach of confidence are then individual 
autonomy, and the recognition of the importance of candour and trust in certain 
relationships. The former values could easily be required to give way to those 
equivalent values as they arise under freedom of expression in circumstances where 
a legitimate public concern has been established. This can be justified on the basis 
that there is greater social utility in the responsible publication of matters that are 
deemed to be of legitimate public concern than in the protection of the individual's 
autonomy. 
But what of the latter values of candour and trust in relationships; does the 
fulfilment of the reciprocal interest and duty test and exercise of responsible 
66 See W v Egdel/ [ 1990] I Ch 359 (CA); Xv Y [ 1988] 2 All ER 648. 
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journalism accommodate adequately the public interests in protecting the 
confidential nature of these relationships? Arguably it can within the duty limb of 
the dual test. The interest in receiving the information will not change simply 
because the information was disclosed within a relationship of confidence, what 
could change is that the person or media organisation communicating the 
information will conceivably not have a duty to disclose it. 
Breach of confidence, and for that matter defamation, actions are littered with 
situations where, having noted the value to the public of receiving the relevant 
information, the courts have considered that bodies other than the media were the 
appropriate forum for the disclosure of the information. 
In British Steel v Granada67 the House of Lords found that while the public were 
entitled to be legitimately interested in the poor financial performance of a 
nationalised industry, this interest was best served by the financial disclosure 
requirements of the Iron and Steel Act (UK) 1975 rather than by disclosure through 
the media. In Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers68 the UK Court of Appeal 
found that although there was a legitimate public interest in the information that 
showed the plaintiff, a jockey, had intentionally breached the rules of racing, it was 
" ... impossible to see what public interest would be served by publishing the 
contents of the tapes which would not equally be served by giving them to the 
police or the Jockey club." 69 
The courts have also made it clear that the media is unlikely to be vested with a 
duty to publish allegations of criminal wrongdoing. Jf a matter is sub Judice such a 
publication will incur liability in contempt of court if it is likely to impede the 
impartial administration of justice.70 In Vickery v McClean 71 where a qualified 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [ I 981] AC I 096 (HL). 
Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [ 1984] I WLR 892 (CA). 
Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [ 1984] I WLR 892, 898 (CA) per Sir John Donaldson MR. 
Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor General [ 1995] 3 NZLR 563 (CA). At 575 Richardson J stated that an 
editor would be prudent not to publish material that could be found in contempt rather than rely on a public 
interest defence. 
Vickery v Mclean (22 June 2000) Court of Appeal, Auckland, CA 125/00. 
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privilege to publish defamatory material was denied, Tipping J summed up the 
Court's aversion to allegations of criminality being made through the media thus: 72 
... that could only encourage trial by media and associated developments which would be 
inimical to criminal justice processes. Society has mechanisms for investigating crime and 
determining guilt or innocence. It is not in the public interest that these mechanisms be 
bypassed or subverted. 
These issues are also evident in the list of considerations pointing to the exercise of 
responsible journalism as outlined in by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds. If however, 
they are given due recognition in the determination of whether the reciprocal duty 
and interest exist, it need not be considered at that later stage. 
In New Zealand the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 also provides a legislative 
indication that the media will not be the appropriate avenue for the disclosure of 
information, of interest or concern to the public, which has been obtained through a 
relationship of confidence. As will be discussed later in this paper, the Act permits 
the disclosure of information related to serious wrongdoing that would otherwise be 
considered confidential through an employer-employee relationship. However the 
Act also prescribes the manner in which these protected disclosures may be made, 
none of which include the media. 73 • Thus it might be assumed that the media may 
only be able to publish such an allegation of serious wrongdoing, and be availed of 
a public interest defence to a breach of confidence action, once any prescribed or 
more appropriate avenues of disclosure and investigation of a matter of legitimate 
public concern have been exhausted. 
This statutory and judicial recognition that a media duty does not inevitably flow 
from the public's legitimate interest in particular information, allows considerable 
room for the protection of trust and candour in relationships through qualified 
72 
73 
Vickery v Mclean (22 June 2000) Court of Appeal, Auckland, CA 125/00, para 19 per Tipping J. 
Protected Disclosures Act 2000, ss 3 and I 0. These list the appropriate authorities to whom protected 
disclosures may be made, including Ministers of the Crown and, in the public sector, the Ombudsman. 
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privilege, particularly given that the onus of establishing the requisite duty and 
interest rests upon the media defendant. 
IV APPLICATION TO INVASION OF PRIVACY 
Similarly the structure of tort of invasion of privacy offers a public interest defence 
of legitimate public concern as the appropriate arena for the balancing exercise 
between freedom of expression and privacy interests to take place. In affirming the 
existence of the tort of invasion of privacy, the Court of Appeal also clarified the 
confusion that followed the decision in P v D74 over whether the legitimate public 
concern in the matter comprised one of the elements of the cause of action or if it 
stood as a defence. It confirmed that legitimate public concern stood as a defence to 
a prima facie invasion of privacy.75 Thus as set out in the joint judgment of Gault P 
and Blanchard J a legitimate public concern in the information may enable 
publication in situations where the complainant has established the fundamental 
requirements for a successful claim of invasion of privacy: the existence of facts in 
respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and publicity given to 
those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to an objective 
reasonable person. Tipping J preferred the formulation of a single element in the 
establishment of the plaintiff's claim, namely that it is actionable in tort to publish 
information or material in which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, with the defence that material constituting a matter of legitimate public 
concern justifies publication in the public interest. 
The element of reasonableness in both of these formulations provides an objective 
element to control the subjective expectations of the individual. Tipping J noted that 
the expectations might arise from the nature of the information or the circumstances 
in which the defendant came into possession of it, or both. It is important to note 
14 P v D (2000) 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
15 Hosking v Runting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA IOI /03, para 129 per Gault P and Blanchard J: 
" ... it is more conceptually sound for this to constitute a defence, particularly given the parallels with 
breach of confidence claims, where public interest is an established defence." 
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that neither of these considerations involves either the status of the individual 
within the public eye, or any other matters that are properly examined under the 
assessment of the defence of legitimate public concern, as other judges have shown 
a tendency to blur the line between these two inquiries. In A v B and C Lord Woolf 
referred to the fact that figures of public note needed to 'expect and accept' a higher 
degree of scrutiny by the media,76 while Randerson J considering Hosking in the 
High Court echoed these sentiments.77 In Campbell also it is evident that Lord 
Nicholls at least considered that Ms Campbell's previous public statements meant 
she was unable to establish that a breach of confidence had occurred.78 
Drawing support from Tipping J's statements in Hosking, and the correct 
characterisation by that Court of legitimate public concern as a defence to the 
action, it is submitted that it is within that defence that the competing interests in 
freedom of expression and privacy are assessed. This would also accord with the 
commonly held view that public figures, like everyone else, are entitled to have 
their privacy protected, and gives a greater foundation than simply their notoriety, 
for permitting the information to be disclosed. It would also make more obvious the 
alignment with defamation and breach of confidence. 
However, having failed to vest the Hoskings' with a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in relation to the photographs taken of their children,79 the majority of the 
Court of Appeal was able to decide in favour of the defendant without reference to 
any legitimate public concern in the photographs. The Court's discussion of 
legitimate public concern is very much limited to the ideas of proportionality. As 
Tipping J noted, "the greater the invasion of privacy the greater must be the level of 
public concern to amount to a defence", and that "no verbal formulation can hope to 
76 
77 
78 
79 
A v Band C [2002] 2 All ER 545, para 11 (xii) (CA) per Lord Woolf. 
Hosking v Runling [2003] 3 NZLR 385, 416 (HC) Randerson J :"the reasonable expectations of privacy of 
[public figures] will necessarily be lower since it is inevitable the media will subject celebrity figures such 
as Mr Hosking to closer scrutiny" 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 995, para 24 (HL) per Lord Nicholls. 
The factors supporting this finding were that the subjects were photographed in a public place and that the 
photos, showing only the subjects' appearance did not contain anything that the reasonable person would 
find highly offensive. 
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do more than lay out the principles to be applied in the individual case."80 Gault P 
and Blanchard J'sjudgment, in acknowledging the question of proportionality, pays 
particular regard to an article examining the emerging right of privacy in the United 
Kingdom by Gavin Phillipson. 81 The main thrust of Phillipson's article is that 
privacy and freedom of expression are rights of equivalent status, and that the issue 
of proportionality must be reflected in the assessment of how the facts of the 
particular case or disclosure contribute to the values underlying freedom of 
expression and privacy advanced by the litigants. This view accords with that 
earlier espoused by Elizabeth Paton-Simpson82 in what she termed the contextual 
approach. Under the contextual approach, the rights asserted by both parties are 
measured by the extent to which they are connected to the interests underlying those 
rights. In the context of media publications this would require an examination into 
how the particular instance of disclosure contributes to the primary public interests 
in freedom of expression, against how the restraint would contribute to the public 
interests underlying the protection of privacy. 
Can an approach based on a reciprocal duty and interest test, and responsible 
journalism, provide sufficient accommodation to the interests underlying the right 
to privacy? 
It is said that privacy is drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy. It 
might best be defined as a condition of limited accessibility of information known 
about an individual, attention paid to an individual, or physical access to an 
individual.83 At its root is the protection of independence, dignity, and the human 
spirit.84 The individual autonomy afforded by privacy enables independent thought, 
diversity of views, and sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas before 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Hosking v Runting (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA 101 /03, para 257 per Tipping J. 
Gavin Phillipson "Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under 
the Human Rights Act" [2003] MLR 726. 
E Paton-Simpson "Human Interests: Privacy and Free Speech in the Balance" (1995) 16 NZULR 225. 
Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" ( I 980) 89 Yale LJ 421 , 428. 
S D Warren and L D Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (I 890) 4 Harv L Rev 193, 196; see also John D R 
Craig " Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common Law Tort Awakens" (1997) 42 McGill L J 
355, 357 
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making them public. 85 By protecting an individual's privacy, their dignity is 
retained by shielding that which they do not want known about themselves from the 
knowledge of others and upholds autonomy by allowing them to control the 
dissemination of that information. 
Unlike defamation, in which qualified privilege deals with matters that may not be 
able to be substantiated as facts and in which truth is a complete defence, privacy is 
not concerned with the truth of the disclosure, but the harm caused by the disclosure 
of that truth. The situation is more akin to that of breach of confidence than 
defamation. It might therefore be argued that even if the matter is one of legitimate 
public concern, the exercise of reasonable care by a media defendant that publishes 
information concerning that matter, will not be sufficient to provide adequate 
protection to competing privacy interests. No matter how diligently the information 
is sourced, verified and reported, the publication of that matter will still harm the 
individual that is the subject of the publication. 
While there is strength in this argument, the filter of the reciprocal duty and interest 
test will still in most cases reduce the likelihood of distressing private revelations 
filling the pages of our newspapers, provided that it is in this ambit of the qualified 
privilege defence that those privacy interests are recognised. The further 
requirement that journalistic responsibility be exercised, will also go some way to 
ensuring that any harm done by the publication of that information is minimised 
through its examination of circumstances of publication including the tone of the 
article and whether the complainant has been offered an opportunity to comment. 
The alternative requires a judicial assessment of individual aspects of the 
publication and how these contribute to or detract from the competing rights of 
freedom of expression and privacy. Such an approach risks an uncertain outcome 
coloured by the intrinsic value that the judge assigns to the publication in question . 
85 Alan F Westin Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head, London, 1970) 34. 
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A Qualified Privilege in Privacy Actions: An Argument Once Tried 
During the Campbell litigation the argument advocated in this paper that following 
the establishment of a legitimate public concern, a media defendant is free to 
publish material that may override a counterclaim to privacy through the exercise of 
a proper degree of journalistic care, was presented to the UK Court of Appeal. 86 
Counsel for the Mirror attempted to draw the analogy between the public interest 
justification for publication of confidential material and qualified privilege. Support 
for this analogy was drawn from South African87 and United States88 case law, 
however the Court of Appeal failed to be persuaded by the argument. It 
distinguished the cases referred to by counsel on the grounds that they were both 
argued under the head of privacy rather than an expanded breach of confidence. The 
Court also signalled that its reluctance to accept counsel's argument stemmed from 
the fact that the expanded breach of confidence and the Reynolds formulation of the 
qualified privilege defence were still at a developmental stage. 
It is not surprising that the Court of Appeal were not comforted by the cases 
referred to by counsel, although they do offer examples of judicial support for using 
the qualified privilege defence in privacy cases. The court in Van Vuuren v Kruger 
made only a very general comment to the effect that the principles determining 
justification to an invasion in privacy were shared with those of the law of 
defamation 89. Bichler, in which the majority of the Appeal Court judges found that 
the same conditional privilege applied to defamation and invasion of privacy, was 
not only decided under Massachusetts state law, but also under a constitutionally 
protected right to privacy that encompasses both the right to withhold embarrassing 
private facts from public view and the right, akin to that protected by defamation 
actions, not to be placed in a false light.90 
86 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] I All ER 224 (CA). 
87 Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger [ 1993) ( 4) SA 842 . 
88 Bichler v Union Bank and Trust Co ( 1984) 745 F 2d I 006. 
89 Jansen van Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger [ 1993) ( 4) SA 842, 850 per Harms AJA "To determine 
whether a prima facie invasion of the right to privacy is justified, it appears that, in general, the principles 
formulated in the context of a defence of justification in the law of defamation ought to apply." 90 See The Restatement ofTorts (Second) (1977) 383 . 
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Interestingly despite their rejection of the Mirror's argument the Court of Appeal 
held that, provided publication of confidential information was justified in the 
public interest, a journalist had to be given reasonable latitude as to the manner in 
which that information was conveyed to the public.91 The Court also determined on 
the facts that the detail given in the article and accompanying photograph were "a 
legitimate, if not an essential , part of the journalistic package"92 required to show 
the public that they had previously been deceived by the supermodel. This despite 
the fact that the article contained some erroneous, though minor, statements of fact. 
Thus it can be argued that the Court of Appeal effectively accepted the argument 
that they had, just moments earlier, expressly rejected. Indeed the Court ' s 
acceptance of journalistic latitude without the commensurate requirement of 
journalistic responsibility derived from qualified privilege, is conceptually a weaker 
position than that put forward by counsel for the Mirror. 
The argument that qualified privilege should not be imported into the tort affording 
protection of privacy interests due to the developing state of the law, can al so be 
disregarded, given that the Reynolds privilege is now firmly established, at least in 
the United Kingdom. As has been argued in this paper it now offers invaluable 
guidance to our emerging tort of privacy. 
B The Question Of Remedies 
Another counter argument to extending the qualified privilege to cases involving 
breach of confidence and invasion of privacy is that the standard required for the 
granting of injunctions is higher in defamation than is appropriate in breach of 
confidence and privacy cases. Traditionally under defamation proceedings an 
injunction will fail if the defendant pleads qualified privilege unless the plaintiff can 
satisfy the court that the defence will fail. The Court of Appeal in TV3 v Fahe/3 
91 
92 
93 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] I All ER 224, para 64 (CA) per Lord Phill ips. 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] I All ER 224, para 62 (CA) per Lord Phillips. 
TV3 Network Services Ltdv Fahey [1 999] 2 NZLR 129. 
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has also stated that any prior restraint of freedom of expression required clear and 
compelling reasons and the passing of a much higher threshold than the arguable 
case standard. This presents a sizeable hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome should they 
wish to prevent publication. 
In breach of confidence and privacy cases, the argument runs that once publication 
is allowed, the confidence or privacy in the material is automatically lost and cannot 
be redressed by damages. The lower arguable case standard has traditionally been 
applied to applications for interim injunction in breach of confidence law for this 
very reason. 94 While it questionable whether damages are a truly adequate remedy 
for reputational injury also, the Court in TV3 v Fahey noted that an injunction 
would be granted in circumstances where harm was not reparable by an award of 
damages. 
There is thus potential for the adequate protection of confidence and privacy 
interests through injunctive relief within the existing approach under defamation, 
although perhaps a greater accommodation of interests could be achieved by 
assessing the basis of the reciprocal duty and interest claim and exercise of 
responsible journalism at an interlocutory stage. 
V LEGITIMATE PUBLIC CONCERN: RECIPROCAL INTEREST AND 
DUTY 
If we accept then that the Reynolds type of qualified privilege can be incorporated 
into actions in breach of confidence and privacy, what certainty does that afford to 
the question of whether material might be published on the grounds that it relates to 
a matter of legitimate public concern. 
To establish that there is a legitimate duty in disclosing, and interest in receiving a 
particular communication in the face of a prima facie established claim in 
94 See Katrine Evans "Was Privacy the Winner on the Day" [2004) NZLJ 181, 183. 
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defamation, breach of confidence or privacy, the communication must evidence at 
least one of the public interest values that underpins freedom of expression other 
than the liberty theory. The essence of the protection afforded to responsible 
publishers of matters of legitimate public concern, as evidenced by these theories, is 
that through their communication the public will be disposed with the resources 
with which to make decisions that will affect their individual or collective lives. 
These values will not always be present, or where they are, to the same degree, in 
the publication of information or material on a particular subject. In order for clear 
principles to emerge surrounding the weight to be given to these values, it will be 
necessary to assess how the courts have to date assessed these values in their 
various determinations of those matters that constitute matters of legitimate public 
concern. 
A Legitimate Public Concern: What the Courts Have Said 
A number of cases have recognised that discussion of political matters is properly 
considered to be of legitimate public concern. In Reynolds, the publication at issue 
was the discussion of the events surrounding the resignation of Albert Reynolds 
from his post as Irish Prime Minister. In that case while the subject matter was 
considered to be "undoubtedly of public concern", the allegations of fact made in 
the publication were held to be defamatory due to the failure of the article to 
mention Mr Reynolds' view of the events. Thus the Times were found not to have 
exercised journalistic responsibility. In Lange v Atkinson, the publication at issue 
questioned the capacity and performance of a Member of Parliament and former 
New Zealand Prime Minister. In both the High Court and Court of appeal, the 
matters discussed were considered to be of public concern. In the High Court, Elias 
J stated that the common law had recognised that freedom of political speech and 
the exchange of information that might influence the exercise of the public's 
electoral rights were necessary for the public welfare, and that comment upon the 
official conduct and suitability of those exercising powers of government were 
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essential to the proper operation of a system of representative democracy. 95 The 
Australian High Court decision in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation96 
which also examined the qualified privilege defence to an action in defamation, 
found support for this same proposition in the Australian Constitution. The Court 
also noted, quoting McHugh J's statement in the earlier case of Stephens v West 
Australian Newspapers Ltcf7 that the quality of life and freedom of Australian 
citizens were highly dependent on the exercise of functions and powers vested in 
public representatives and officials and that therefore that information concerning 
the exercise of these functions were of legitimate interest to the general public. 
The Courts' findings that these various forms of political discussion were matters of 
legitimate public concern demonstrate an obvious link to the theories of the 
marketplace of ideas and support and maintenance of democracy. The weight 
attached to freedom of expression relating to political matters also demonstrates two 
other key aspects determinant in the finding of legitimate public concern; the 
breadth of audience that has an interest in, and has the potential to be tangibly 
affected by, the exercise of governmental powers. 
These same elements are present in a number of cases concerning the exercise of 
functions by government officials. In the Privy Council decision in Bonnic/<8, the 
plaintiff was the managing director of a Government-owned company with a 
monopoly over the import of basic foods into Jamaica. He claimed that an article in 
a national newspaper that appeared to link the termination of his employment with 
questionable contracts entered into for the importation of milk powder were 
defamatory. The Court held that the activities of the company and the competence 
of its management were matters of considerable public concern due to the fact that 
its import business affected the cost of living of everyone in Jamaica. Similarly in 
the breach of confidence case of Lion Laboratories the UK Court of Appeal held 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd [I 997] 2 NZLR 22, 33 (HC) per Elias J. 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 145 ALR 96 (HCA). 
Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 80 (HCA) . 
Bonnick v Morris and Others [2003] 1 AC 300 (PC). 
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that the competent functioning of breathaliser equipment was an issue of public 
concern raising as it did "serious questions that affect the life, and even the liberty, 
of an unascertainable number of Her Majesty's subjects ... "99 In British Steel v 
Granada'
00 
the public were held to be entitled to be legitimately interested in the 
poor performance a nationalised industry. This finding was reached due to the effect 
of the industry's performance had on the public purse. Discussion of the failings of 
the National Security Service, even of another country, have similarly been held to 
be a matter of legitimate public concern. 101 
A number of cases have also concluded that information concerning wrongdoing 
will also be considered a matter of legitimate public concern. In breach of 
confidence and defamation actions the public concern in the identification of 
fraud, 
102 
other criminal activities103 and public misrepresentations, 104 has received 
recognition by the courts as matters of public concern, though as has been discussed 
previously, with reservations about the appropriate forum for the disclosure of this 
information. In such circumstances there is both a breadth of public interest in the 
identification and prevention of acts that are contrary to the laws that society 
operates under, and potential for tangible harm to be suffered by a significant 
proportion of the public were they to fall victim to such wrongdoing. 
The protection of the public from harm is a significant factor in a number of other 
circumstances in which a legitimate public concern has been found to rest in 
publications issued to the public at large. In Hubbard v Vosper Lord Denning found 
that the potential harm caused by the practices of the Church of Scientology was 
such that legitimate public concern was sufficient to outweigh any confidentiality 
99 lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans and Others [ 1985] QB 526, 546 (CA) per Stephenson LJ. 
100 British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [ 1981] AC 1096 (HL). 
101 Allorney-Generalfor the United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129, 179 (CA) per 
McMullin J, in which it was held that the New Zealand public had a legitimate interest in information 
regarding the failings of the British Security Service, due to the strong links with its New Zealand 
counterpart. 
102 European Pacific Banking Corporation v Television New Zealand Ltd [ 1994] 3 NZLR 43 (CA); Gartside v 
Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113. 
103 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [ 1984] 1 WLR 892 (CA). 
104 Initial Services Ltd v Pul/eri/1 and Another [ 1967] 3 All ER 145 (CA). 
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surrounding those practices.
105 In Distillers Co. 106 information that sought to cast 
light on the release of the thalidomide drug that caused countless birth defects, was 
considered of public concern, although the timing of the release of the information 
was pivotal to a public interest defence not being afforded in that particular 
instance. Tillery Valley Foods v Channel Four 107 is another recent case in which 
public health and safety was a key determinant in the establishment of legitimate 
public concern. The disclosures related to the plaintiff company's poor hygiene 
practices in the preparation of frozen meals for supply to, amongst others, public 
hospitals. There the public interest in the allegations made by the defendant was so 
obvious that it was conceded by counsel for the plaintiff. 
B Legitimate Public Concern: Legislative Clues 
Further guidance as to the types of subject that may be considered of legitimate 
public concern can be found in the Protected Disclosures Act 2000. The purpose of 
the Act, as set out in section 5, is to promote the public interest by facilitating 
disclosure and investigation of serious wrongdoing in or by an organisation, and 
protecting employees that make these disclosures on the basis and in the manner 
provided by the Act. Protection of persons making such disclosures is required to 
counter any liability that the person may otherwise face through breach of 
confidence or contract. Section 3 of the Act defines serious wrongdoing as 
variously: unlawful, corrupt or irregular use of funds or resources of a public sector 
organisation; or a serious risk to public health or safety or the environment; or a 
serious risk to the maintenance of law, including prevention, investigation and 
detection of offences and right to a fair trial; or any act that constitutes an offence; 
or oppressive, improperly discriminatory, grossly negligent conduct or gross 
mismanagement by a public official. 
105 Hubbard v Vosper [ 1972] 2 QB 84, 96 (CA) per Lord Denning:" ... there is good ground for thinking that 
these [Scientology] courses contain such dangerous material that it is in the public interest that it should be 
made known." See also Church of Scientology of California v Kaufman [ 1973] RPC 627. 
106 Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [ 1975] 1 QB 613 (QB). 
107 Tillery Valley Foods v Channel Four Television and another [2004] All ER 133 (Ch). 
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These categories of wrongdoing bear a close resemblance to the types of 
information deemed to be of legitimate public concern by courts considering 
defamation and breach of confidence. The undercurrent running through all of these 
categories is that the matter about which the disclosure is, or is sought to be made, 
has a tangible effect on a broad section of the public. Provided that this interest of 
the public is established upon these grounds, a media defendant would seem to have 
a duty to make disclosures to the public on those matters in which they have a 
legitimate interest. 
C Invasion of Privacy: A Different Category of Subject Matter? 
But to what degree are these matters apparent in an action involving a complaint 
alleging invasion of privacy? In Hosking Tipping J was of the opinion that the 
marketplace of ideas theory, i.e. the advancement of knowledge and discovery of 
truth, was unlikely to be of relevance to the exercise of freedom of expression in 
cases involving privacy. 108 While he did concede that concerns relating to the 
maintenance of the democratic process may arise, the predominant value underlying 
freedom of expression in these cases he opined would be the liberty theory. This he 
considered to be the weakest foundation for freedom of expression to be taken into 
account in the balancing exercise and determination of proportionality. 109 Does this 
mean that at best, the legitimate public concern defence will be merely a bit player 
in privacy actions? 
The determination of the public interest in disclosures of the private affairs of 
figures with public prominence have come before the courts under other causes of 
action. The New South Wales Supreme Court was called upon to determine the 
public interest in the extra-marital affairs of a prominent sportsperson in the case of 
Chappell v TCN Channel Nine.110 While the Courts' disdain for the "sleazy gutter 
journalism" exhibited by the defendant is palpable throughout the judgment, Hunt J 
108 Hosking v Run ling (25 March 2004) Court of Appeal CA I O 1/03, para 233 per Tipping J. 
109 Hosking, above, para 235 per Tipping J. 
11° Chappell v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153 . 
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following Mutch v Sleeman' 11 laid down two circumstances in which the private 
behaviour or character of a public figure could be of public interest: (a) because it 
has some bearing upon their capacity to perform their public activities; or (b) 
because they make it such a matter themselves. Under such circumstances the 
marketplace of ideas theory, and depending on the public activities of the 
individual, the maintenance of democracy theory, are activitated. On the facts of 
that case because neither of these circumstances was found to exist, the defendant 
was not availed of a public interest defence to the plaintiffs claim of defamation. 
In the United Kingdom, where Hunt J commented such disclosures had been raised 
to an art form by certain tabloids, a number of cases have arisen in which 
statements of fact regarding a person of high public profile's private life have been 
published to the general public. These cases have generally involved persons who 
have attained a degree of celebrity status unrelated to the performance of any 
official public duties. Jn Woodward v Hutchings' 12 the plaintiffs were a group of 
popular singers whose excesses, and in one instance, sexual antics were revealed by 
their former manager. In identifying a public concern in the receipt of this 
information, Lord Denning noted that the group had presented to the public at large 
an image of a particular lifestyle which the disclosed facts would correct in the 
minds of the public. In Campbell it was acknowledged, even by their Lordships that 
denied the Mirror a public interest defence, that due to Ms Campbell's previous 
public denials of drug use, the public had a legitimate interest in the revelation that 
she did in fact have a drug problem. In A v Band C113 Lord Woolf went further, 
finding that there was a public interest in the extra-marital affairs of a professional 
footballer, even though he had not courted publicity or previously brought the 
subject of his family life to the attention of the public; that conduct which in the 
case of private individual wound not be the appropriate subject of comment can be 
so in the case of a public figure. 
111 Mulch v Sleeman ( 1928) 29 SR (NSW) 125. 
11 2 Woodward v Hu!chings [ 1977] 2 All ER 751 (CA). 
113 A v Band C [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA). 
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The decision in A v B and C stands on dubious foundations if the rules set down in 
Chappell with its link to the marketplace of ideas and maintenance of democracy 
theories provide the justification for the private lives of public figures being matters 
of public interest. In the New Zealand High Court decision of P v D 114 Nicholson J, 
in a brief assessment of legitimate public concern, considered there to be no public 
interest in the plaintiff's previous psychiatric troubles or institutionalisation. 
Nicholson J found on the facts that the matter did not impact on the performance of 
the plaintiff's public activities, nor had his mental health been brought to the 
public's attention previously. This finding accords well with the law as proposed in 
Chappell which it is argued, should form the basis of the recognition of legitimate 
public concern in matters pertaining to individuals that would otherwise receive the 
protection of the law. 
The question of how the media's duty anses in these circumstances can be 
addressed if recognition is also given to the importance of the media in supporting 
the public's decision making on social and moral matters. It is said that modern 
media fills a void in the proliferation of this type of information that has been 
brought about by large populations and anonymous and impersonal lifestyles. 11 5 
The interest in the private lives of others and the way in which the lessons learned 
by others shape our own behaviour, reflects the universal human interest in the way 
we live, and the less intimate communities that typify modern society. As was noted 
by Lord Woolf in A v Band C 11 6 public figures play a significant role in shaping 
societal norms, they set examples (as well as the fashion), they endorse products, 
they live lives that many aspire to. If this is accepted, then provided that there is 
justification for the public to be concerned in the relevant of their private lives, 
there can be found a corresponding duty on the media to communicate it. 
11 4 p v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
11 5 F Zimmerman "Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandcis's Privacy Tort" ( 1983) 
68 Cornell L Rev 291 , 333. 
11 6 A v Band C [2002] 2 All ER 545 (CA). 
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VI THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE FORMULA 
The principles that determine the media's qualified privilege to publish fact and 
comment on a matter of legitimate public concern, to be considered following the 
prima facie establishment of an action in defamation, breach of confidence or 
invasion of privacy, can thus be summarised as follows: 
The privilege will arise in circumstances where there is legitimate public concern in 
the matter being published to the extent that the audience receiving the information 
has a legitimate interest in receiving the information, and the publisher of that 
information has a corresponding duty to communicate it. 
Given the potential reach of the media, the interest of the audience will be 
legitimate where it arises from a broad, if not the entire, section of the public; and 
where the interest displays direct reference to the marketplace of ideas or 
maintenance and support of democracy theories, or is to protect the audience from 
harm. The interest can extend into the private lives of individuals provided that the 
matter either affects the capacity of the individual to perform their public functions, 
or it is a matter that has been brought into the public domain by the individual 
themselves. 
If the interest is so established, the media, through its role as the primary 
communicator of information to the public, will then have a duty to provide to them 
information concerning that matter, provided that there are no other appropriate 
avenues for the disclosure of that information. 
The qualified privilege arising from that reciprocal interest and duty may be lost if 
the publication was motivated by ill will towards the plaintiff, or if responsible 
journalism, as evidenced through the steps taken to ensure accuracy, balance and 
fairness in the publication, is not exercised. 
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A The Impact on Campbell 
If such an approach had been adopted in Campbell the decision would have been far 
easier for the House of Lords to agree upon. There is little doubt that the 
information contained in the article, even if broken down into its constituent parts, 
would have been sufficient to establish a prima facie finding of invasion of Ms 
Campbell's privacy. The article disclosed private information about her that the 
objective reasonable person would find offensive; the fact of her drug addiction and 
treatment, and the location and admittedly erroneous details of her counselling 
sessions at Narcotics Anonymous. The issue of the accompanying photographs is 
less clear, as in themselves they did not convey any information that could be 
termed offensive, but through the accompanying narrative they also conveyed the 
fact of her treatment. 
Having established a prima facie invasion of her privacy, the next question should 
have been whether there was a legitimate public concern in that information. The 
court held, correctly, that the public were entitled to receive the information due to 
Ms Campbell's public profile and the fact that she had made previous public 
statements to the effect that she did not take recreational drugs. The public's interest 
in the private behaviour of a public figure was thus triggered because, under the 
approach outlined in Chappell, she had made it a matter of public interest herself. 
The media's duty to communicate the information existed through its place as the 
conduit of information of interest to the public and the absence of a more 
appropriate avenue for the disclosure of the information. The existence of this duty 
is further strengthened by the fact that her previous denials, the record of which the 
Mirror was setting straight, had been issued through the media. 
The final question of whether the Mirror had exercised journalistic responsibility in 
the preparation and publication of the article would also, it is argued, be able to be 
made out by the defendant. There is no question as to the fact that Ms Campbell 
was attending Narcotics Anonymous and therefore was a drug addict. The very fact 
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that she was photographed exiting a counselling session substantiated this. While 
there were some errors in fact regarding the history and frequency of her attendance 
at these sessions, these were minor details within the bigger picture of the 
disclosure of her addiction and treatment. Taken as a whole, and in the deadline 
context of publication, the information was essentially accurate. 
The original publication could also not be considered unbalanced or unfair. As was 
noted by their Lordships, the tone of the publication was sympathetic and 
supportive. Ms Campbell's spokeswoman had been approached for comment, 
although none was given. The articles published following the commencement of 
legal proceedings were far less balanced, however by this stage the information of 
her addiction and treatment were already public knowledge and the critical 
statements comment. 
Thus under a qualified privilege approach, the Mirror should have escaped liability. 
However, had the critical element of Ms Campbell's prior public denial's not been 
present, the reciprocal interest and duty would not have arisen, and regardless of the 
degree of responsibility shown by the Mirror, her claim against them would have 
been upheld. 
VII CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The author has argued that an approach that offers qualified privilege to media 
organisations in cases of defamation, breach of confidence and privacy allows for 
sufficient accommodation of the public interests at stake. It also offers all concerned 
a far greater degree of legal certainty than exists currently, particularly in regards to 
our developing tort of invasion of privacy. 
There will inevitably be potential for grey areas to emerge within the determination 
of the reciprocal interest and duty and the exercise of journalistic responsibility in 
relation to particular publications. The presumption that matters of public import 
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are made known and expectation that the media ensures accuracy, balance and 
fairness in any publication, are, however, uncontentious. Indeed without these the 
media's credibility is undermined, and its communications will cease to be believed 
or heeded, be they true or false, important or trivial. 
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